Asset Bubble, Not Yet Here?! Analysis of Implications from the 1995 AI Boom and the 1969 FED (NH Investment & Securities)
Asset Bubble, Not Yet Here?! Analysis of Implications from the 1995 AI Boom and the 1969 FED (NH Investment & Securities)
π Summary
NH Investment & Securities' report compares the current US AI industry to the 1995 IT boom and the Fed's situation to the 1969 liquidity expansion period. It analyzes that concerns about an asset bubble are premature due to increasing asset demand and sustained liquidity supply.
π Why It Matters! (Significance and Context)
While many analyses suggest the current economic situation resembles the period immediately preceding the IT bubble, this report conducts an in-depth analysis of the present economic environment by applying the 1995 AI industry growthand the 1969 FED situation. It particularly highlights that even with corporate profits as a percentage of GDP at an all-time high, liquidity is increasing, and asset income growth is outpacing labor income growth. It explains that the deepening imbalance between asset demand and supply and the debate over potential interest rate cuts suggest the current phase may not represent the initial stage of a bubble.
π₯ Key Takeaways
1️⃣ AI Industry Growth and Expanding IT Investment (Compared to 1995)
- The growth of the AI industry in the US resembles that of 1995.
- There is a precedent where the share of IT investment relative to GDP surged from 2% to 5% between 1997 and 2000.
- The share of M7 Big Tech companies' capital expenditures (CAPEX) in U.S. GDP has grown to levels seen in the late 1990s, but the situation is not yet critically overheated.
- While the revenue performance relative to investment for some Big Tech companies remains modest ($35 billion in revenue against $560 billion spent over two years), the reduction in corporate debt ratios and increase in profits are positive developments.
2️⃣ Excess Asset Demand and Sustained Liquidity Supply (Comparison with 1969 FED)
- The current situation of the U.S. FED (Federal Reserve) resembles that of 1969, when the share of corporate profits relative to GDP reached an all-time high.
- Liquidity continues to increase, leading to a phenomenon where the growth rate of asset income exceeds the growth rate of labor income.
- Over the past 75 years, the growth rate of asset demand (415%) has significantly exceeded the growth rate of asset supply (31 percentage points) globally. This excess asset demand is projected to persist for the next 75 years (Ludwig Straub, Harvard University Professor).
- While GDP and labor income are flows, assets accumulate as a stock, resulting in a high asset-to-disposable-income ratio (880%). This creates a virtuous cycle where increased consumption further drives up asset prices.
- The value of money continuously declines (illustrated by the analogy: $100,000 in 1960 could buy 112 gold axes, but in 2025, only one).
3️⃣ Rebuttal of the Possibility of Interest Rate Declines and Bubble Concerns
- Steve Mearon, a Fed Governor, raised the argument for a 0% benchmark interest rate decline, which contains several logical fallacies.
- Increased tariff revenues are mostly used for tax cuts, resulting in a negligible effect on lowering interest rates.
- Foreign investment (from Korea, Japan) must consider the reduction in existing investments.
- Growth rate increases due to tax cuts are actually factors pushing interest rates up.
- Immigration decline has little impact on the low-skilled labor market.
- For these reasons, the likelihood of interest rate declines is low, suggesting bubble concerns are unfounded and that the current situation may differ from the 1998-1999 IT bubble era.
- The phenomenon of 10-year Treasury yields rising despite benchmark rate cuts indicates continued liquiditysupply through increased government spending and corporate investment.
- Unlike the late 1990s when the internet bubble burst amid falling 10-year yields, the current resilience of 10-year yields suggests the possibility that this is not yet a bubble.
π To summarize
The NH Investment & Securities report draws parallels between the current economic situation and the 1995 IT investment boom and the 1969 liquidity expansion period. It analyzes that structural issues, where asset demandoverwhelms supply alongside corporate investment expansion centered on the AI industry, are driving asset priceincreases. Specifically, record-high corporate profits relative to GDP, asset income exceeding labor income, and the sustained upward trend in 10-year Treasury yields demonstrate that liquidity continues to be supplied. By countering arguments for interest rate declines and bubble concerns, it acknowledges overheating in asset markets but asserts that a bubble collapse is premature. It summarizes that a robust cycle exists where increased assets stimulate consumption, which in turn drives up asset prices.
π° Investment Advice
- U.S. Stocks (Individual Stocks, Index-Tracking ETFs): Maintain a buy stance, considering the ongoing liquiditysupply, rising corporate profits, and growth in the AI industry. Pay particular attention to the long-term growth potential of the M7 Big Tech companies.
- Bonds: Given the upward trend in 10-year Treasury yields and logical counterarguments against interest rate declines, exercise caution with aggressive buying of long-term Treasuries based on rate cut expectations.
- Currency (Cash): Avoid long-term holding, considering the persistent trend of currency devaluation.
π·️ Keywords
#AIindustry #Assetbubble #Liquidity #Assetdemand #Laborincome #Corporateprofits #10yeartreasuryyield #FED #BigTech #Currencydepreciation #Assetpriceinflation #Investmentstrategy
μμ° λ²λΈ, μμ§ λ©μλ€?! 1995λ AI λΆκ³Ό 1969λ FEDμ μμ¬μ λΆμ (NHν¬μμ¦κΆ)
π νμ€μμ½
NHν¬μμ¦κΆ 리ν¬νΈλ λ―Έκ΅μ AI μ°μ μ 1995λ IT λΆμ, μ°μ€(FED)μ μν©μ 1969λ μ λμ± ν½μ°½κΈ°μ λΉμ νλ©°, μ¦κ°νλ μμ° μμμ μ§μμ μΈ μ λμ± κ³΅κΈμΌλ‘ μΈν΄ μμ° λ²λΈ μ°λ €λ μμ§ μκΈ°μμ‘°μμ λΆμνλ€.
π μ μ€μνκ°! (μλ―Έμ λ§₯λ½)
νμ¬μ κ²½μ μν©μ΄ κ³Όκ±° IT λ²λΈ μ§μ κ³Ό μ μ¬νλ€λ λΆμμ΄ λ§μ§λ§, λ³Έ 리ν¬νΈλ 1995λ AI μ°μ μ±μ₯κ³Ό 1969λ FED μν©μ λμ νμ¬ ν κ²½μ νκ²½μ μ¬μΈ΅ λΆμνλ€. νΉν, GDP λλΉ κΈ°μ μ΄μ΅ λΉμ€μ΄ μ¬μ μ΅κ³ μμ€μΈ μν©μμλ μ λμ±μ΄ λκ³ , μμ° μλ μ¦κ°μ¨μ΄ κ·Όλ‘μλ μ¦κ°μ¨μ μμ§λ₯΄λ νμμ μ£Όλͺ©νλ©°, μμ° μμμ 곡κΈμ λΆκ· ν μ¬ν λ° κΈλ¦¬ νλ½ κ°λ₯μ± λ Όλμ ν΅ν΄ ν μμ μ΄ κ±°νμ μ΄κΈ° λ¨κ³κ° μλ μ μμμ μ€λͺ νλ€.
π₯ ν΅μ¬ ν¬μΈνΈ (Key takeaways)
1️⃣ AI μ°μ μ μ±μ₯μΈμ IT ν¬μ νλ (1995λ λΉκ΅)
λ―Έκ΅μ AI μ°μ μ±μ₯μ 1995λ κ³Ό μ μ¬ν¨.
1997λ μμ 2000λ μ¬μ΄ GDP λλΉ IT ν¬μ λΉμ€μ΄ 2%μμ 5%κΉμ§ κΈμ¦ν μ λ‘κ° μμ.
M7 λΉ ν ν¬μ μ€λΉ ν¬μ(CAPEX)κ° λ―Έκ΅ GDPμμ μ°¨μ§νλ λΉμ€μ΄ 1990λ λ νλ°λ§νΌ λμμΌλ, μμ§ μ¬κ°ν κ³Όμ΄ μν©μ μλ.
μΌλΆ λΉ ν ν¬μ ν¬μ λλΉ λ§€μΆ μ±κ³Όλ μμ§ λ―Έλ―Ένμ§λ§(2λ λμ 5,600μ΅ λ¬λ¬ μ§μΆ λλΉ 350μ΅ λ¬λ¬ λ§€μΆ), κΈ°μ λ€μ λΆμ± λΉμ¨ κ°μμ μ΄μ΅ μ¦κ°λ κΈμ μ μ.
2️⃣ μμ° μμ μ΄κ³Όμ μ λμ± μ§μ κ³΅κΈ (1969λ FED λΉκ΅)
λ―Έκ΅ FED(μ°μ€) μν©μ GDP λλΉ κΈ°μ μ΄μ΅ λΉμ€μ΄ μ¬μ μ΅κ³ μμ€μ΄μλ 1969λ κ³Ό μ μ¬ν¨.
μ λμ±μ΄ κ³μ μ¦κ°νλ©° μμ° μλ μ¦κ°μ¨μ΄ κ·Όλ‘μλ μ¦κ°μ¨μ μννλ νμ λ°μ.
μ§λ 75λ κ° μ μΈκ³μ μΌλ‘ μμ° μμ μ¦κ°μ¨(415%)μ΄ μμ° κ³΅κΈ μ¦κ°μ¨(31%p)μ ν¬κ² μ΄κ³ΌνμΌλ©°, μ΄λ¬ν μμ° μμ μ΄κ³Ό νμμ ν₯ν 75λ λμλ μ§μλ κ²μ΄λΌλ μ λ§(루λλΉν μνΈλΌμ νλ²λλ κ΅μ).
GDPμ κ·Όλ‘μλμ΄ μ λ(flow)μΈ λ°λ©΄, μμ°μ μ λ(stock)μΌλ‘ μμ¬ κ°μ²λΆ μλ λλΉ μμ° λΉμ¨(880%)μ΄ λκ³ , μ΄λ‘ μΈν΄ μλΉκ° λκ³ λ€μ μμ° κ°κ²©μ μμΉμν€λ μν κ³ λ¦¬κ° νμ±λ¨.
νν κ°μΉλ μ§μμ μΌλ‘ νλ½ν¨(1960λ 10λ§ λ¬λ¬λ‘ κΈλλΌ 112μ루, 2025λ 1μ루 ꡬ맀 κ°λ₯ λΉμ ).
3️⃣ κΈλ¦¬ νλ½ κ°λ₯μ±κ³Ό λ²λΈ μ°λ €μ λν λ°λ°
μ€ν°λΈ λ―Έλ° μ°μ€ μ΄μ¬κ° μ κΈ°ν κΈ°μ€ κΈλ¦¬ 0% νλ½ μ£Όμ₯μ μ¬λ¬ λ Όλ¦¬μ μ€λ₯κ° μμ.
κ΄μΈ μμ μ¦κ°λ λλΆλΆ κ°μΈμ μ¬μ©λμ΄ κΈλ¦¬ νλ½ ν¨κ³Ό λ―Έλ―Έ.
μΈκ΅ ν¬μ(νκ΅, μΌλ³Έ)λ κΈ°μ‘΄ ν¬μμ κ°μλ₯Ό κ³ λ €ν΄μΌ ν¨.
κ°μΈλ‘ μΈν μ±μ₯λ₯ μμΉμ μ€νλ € κΈλ¦¬ μμΉ μμΈ.
μ΄λ―Ό κ°μλ μ μλ ¨ λ Έλ μμ₯μ ν° μν₯ μμ.
μ΄λ¬ν μ΄μ λ‘ κΈλ¦¬ νλ½ κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ ν¬μ§ μμ λ²λΈ μ°λ €κ° ν¬μ§ μλ€κ³ λΆμνλ©°, 1998~1999λ IT λ²λΈ μκΈ°μ λ€λ₯Ό μ μμμ μμ¬.
κΈ°μ€ κΈλ¦¬ μΈνμλ 10λ λ¬Ό κ΅μ± κΈλ¦¬κ° μ€λ₯΄λ νμμ μ λΆ μ§μΆ λ° κΈ°μ ν¬μ μ¦κ°λ‘ μ λμ±μ΄ κ³μ 곡κΈλ¨μ μλ―Έ.
10λ λ¬Ό κΈλ¦¬κ° νλ½νλ©° μΈν°λ· λ²λΈμ΄ κΊΌμ‘λ 1990λ λ νλ°κ³Ό λ¬λ¦¬, νμ¬ 10λ λ¬Ό κΈλ¦¬κ° μ΄μμλ€λ κ²μ μμ§ κ±°νμ΄ μλ κ°λ₯μ±μ μμ¬ν¨.
π μ 리νλ©΄
NHν¬μμ¦κΆ 리ν¬νΈλ νμ¬μ κ²½μ μν©μ 1995λ IT ν¬μ νλμ 1969λ μ λμ± ν½μ°½ μκΈ°μ λΉλμ΄ μ€λͺ νλ©°, AI μ°μ μ μ€μ¬μΌλ‘ ν κΈ°μ μ ν¬μ νλμ ν¨κ» μμ° μμκ° κ³΅κΈμ μλνλ ꡬ쑰μ λ¬Έμ κ° μμ° κ°κ²© μμΉμ 견μΈνλ€κ³ λΆμνλ€. νΉν, GDP λλΉ κΈ°μ μ΄μ΅ μ¬μ μ΅κ³ μΉ, μμ° μλμ κ·Όλ‘μλ μν, κ·Έλ¦¬κ³ 10λ λ¬Ό κ΅μ± κΈλ¦¬ μμΉμΈ μ μ§λ μ λμ±μ΄ μ§μμ μΌλ‘ 곡κΈλκ³ μμμ λ°©μ¦νλ€. κΈλ¦¬ νλ½ μ£Όμ₯κ³Ό λ²λΈ μ°λ €μ λν λ°λ°μ ν΅ν΄, μμ° μμ₯μ κ³Όμ΄μ μΈμ νλ κ±°ν λΆκ΄΄λ μμ§ μκΈ°μμ‘°μ΄λ©°, μμ°μ΄ λμ΄ μλΉλ₯Ό μ΄μ§νκ³ λ€μ μμ° κ°κ²©μ λμ΄μ¬λ¦¬λ μν κ³ λ¦¬κ° κ²¬κ³ νλ€κ³ μμ½ν μ μλ€.
π° ν¬μ μ‘°μΈ
λ―Έκ΅ μ£Όμ(κ°λ³ μ’ λͺ©, μ§μ μΆμ’ ETF): μ§μμ μΈ μ λμ± κ³΅κΈκ³Ό κΈ°μ μ΄μ΅ μ¦κ°, AI μ°μ μ±μ₯μ μνλ₯Ό κ³ λ €νμ¬ λ§€μ κ΄μ μ μ§. νΉν M7 λΉ ν ν¬μ μ₯κΈ° μ±μ₯ μ μ¬λ ₯μ μ£Όλͺ©.
μ±κΆ: 10λ λ¬Ό κ΅μ± κΈλ¦¬ μμΉμΈ λ° κΈλ¦¬ νλ½ κ°λ₯μ±μ λν λ Όλ¦¬μ λ°λ°μ κ³ λ €ν λ, κΈλ¦¬ μΈνλ₯Ό κΈ°λν μ₯κΈ° κ΅μ±μ λν μ κ·Ήμ μΈ λ§€μλ μ μ€ν΄μΌ ν¨.
νν(νκΈ): νν κ°μΉκ° μ§μμ μΌλ‘ νλ½νλ μΆμΈλ₯Ό κ³ λ €νμ¬ μ₯κΈ°μ μΈ λ³΄μ λ μ§μ.
π·️ ν€μλ
#AIμ°μ #μμ°λ²λΈ #μ λμ± #μμ°μμ #κ·Όλ‘μλ #κΈ°μ μ΄μ΅ #10λ λ¬Όκ΅μ±κΈλ¦¬ #FED #λΉ ν ν¬ #ννκ°μΉνλ½ #μμ°κ°κ²©μμΉ #ν¬μμ λ΅
π¨μ£Όμ: μ΄ λΈλ‘κ·Έ μλ£λ μ μκΆμ μν΄ λ³΄νΈλ©λλ€. λΈλ‘κ·Έμμ λ€λ£¨λ λ΄μ©μ ν¬μ κΆμ λ₯Ό λͺ©μ μΌλ‘ νμ§ μμΌλ©°, νΉμ κΈμ΅ μνμ λ§€μ λλ λ§€λλ₯Ό κΆμ₯νμ§ μμ΅λλ€. ν¬μ κ²°μ μ μ μ μΌλ‘ λ³ΈμΈμ μ± μ νμ μ΄λ£¨μ΄μ ΈμΌ νλ©°, μ΄ λΈλ‘κ·Έμμ μ± μμ§μ§ μμ΅λλ€.